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Abstract 
This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within 
this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net 
inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is 
stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding 
liquidity, as measured by the Treasury–Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and 
prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong 
incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co–invested are 
more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of 
funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
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1. Introduction 
 
“If you thought getting into a hedge fund was tough, try getting out of one.”  
– Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2008 
During the recent financial crisis, the use of redemption gates by hedge fund 
managers caught many investors by surprise. Gates allow hedge funds to limit the percentage 
of fund capital that can be redeemed by investors at any time. Hedge funds that raised gates 
include the large and hitherto successful Citadel, Tudor Investment Corp, Fortress Investment 
Group, and D.E. Shaw.1 Fund managers argue that gates protect investors as they permit 
funds to liquidate in an orderly fashion and avoid selling assets at fire sale prices (Pulvino, 
1998; and Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). Investors contend that fund managers who 
raised gates, especially those who continue to levy management fees on gated capital, care 
more about business continuity than about investor protection. Underlying all this are 
concerns that the hedge fund industry suffers from an asset–liability mismatch.2 Investors 
worry that a disparity could exist between the liquidity that hedge funds say they can provide 
and the liquidity of their underlying assets. 
Motivated by these events, I study hedge funds that offer favorable redemption terms, 
i.e., monthly redemptions or better. These funds provide a fertile ground to search for 
instances in which hedge funds overpromise in terms of liquidity. I ask the following: How 
liquid are these liquid hedge funds? Do these hedge funds take on excessive liquidity risk? 
                                                            
1 See Wall Street Journal (2008a, 2008c) 
2 Asset–liability mismatches have other implications in finance. According to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
model, the duration mismatch between banks’ illiquid long–term loans and liquid short–term deposits can 
engender self–fulfilling bank runs. Similarly, according to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), the asset–liability 
mismatch in the hedge fund industry could accelerate the demise of hedge funds that are experiencing 
difficulties and make them susceptible to predatory trading.   
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That is, are they forced to sell assets at fire sale prices in response to investor redemptions?  
If so, what drives the excessive liquidity risk–taking? To proxy for excessive liquidity risk, I 
use the impact of investor demand shocks on fund returns. In doing so, I leverage on the 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) concept of a loss spiral, a concept motivated by Shleifer 
and Vishny’s (1992) work on asset fire sales. In a loss spiral, initial losses by speculators 
precipitate investor redemptions that force speculators to sell assets at fire sale prices, thereby 
inducing further investor withdrawals. According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), this 
interaction between market liquidity (the ease with which assets can be traded) and funding 
liquidity (the ease with which traders can obtain financing) can explain why liquidity can 
suddenly dry up, co–moves with the market, and has commonalities across securities. A 
major channel through which this interaction can occur is via hedge funds. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this channel has become more important as several investment banks 
have scaled back or wound down their proprietary trading operations following the 2008 
financial crisis.3  
The empirical findings are striking. Substantial variation exists in the liquidity risk of 
these liquid hedge funds. Within this group of funds, the portfolio of funds with high liquidity 
risk exposure outperforms the portfolio of funds with low liquidity risk exposure by 5.80% 
per year (t–statistic = 2.26). To measure systematic liquidity risk exposure,4 I use fund beta 
with respect to the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) market–wide liquidity measure (henceforth 
                                                            
3 See Financial Times (2009) and Wall Street Journal (2008b).  
4 The focus of this paper is on the concept of market liquidity as a non diversifiable risk factor, i.e., systematic 
liquidity risk, and not on asset–specific liquidity characteristic, i.e., liquidity level. In the absence of complete 
fund holdings information, fund liquidity levels are often estimated using fund return serial correlation. Thus, by 
focusing on systematic liquidity risk, one can side–step issues such as the linear extrapolation of prices for 
thinly traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, and deliberate performance smoothing that 
plague serial correlation in hedge fund returns. See Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Bollen and Poole 
(2008). 
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PS measure).5 The PS measure is particularly suited for gauging liquidity risk as it is based 
on temporary price changes accompanying order flow.6 I account for risks that are not 
directly related to liquidity with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven–factor model. I adjust the 
bond factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model appropriately for duration so that they 
represent returns on traded portfolios.7 After adjusting for co–variation with these factors, the 
spread is 6.11% per year (t–statistic = 2.58). The relation between liquidity risk exposure and 
fund performance also manifests in cross–sectional regressions. Controlling for other hedge 
fund characteristics, a one standard deviation increase in liquidity risk exposure is associated 
with a 2.20% per annum (t–statistic = 2.90) surge in annual returns. These results reinforce 
those of Sadka (2010) who shows that liquidity risk, as measured by the Sadka (2006) 
information–driven, permanent–variable component of price impact, can explain the cross–
sectional variation in hedge fund returns. Because the price impact of asset fire sales, as 
envisaged by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), is transitory and unrelated to information, I argue 
that the PS measure is more relevant for my purposes.   
The aforementioned results suggest that hedge funds that grant favorable redemption 
terms differ significantly in terms of their appetites for liquidity risk. Moreover, the rewards 
for bearing liquidity risk are high. But do these hedge funds take on excessive liquidity risk? I 
show that liquidity risk exposure parlays into problems for hedge funds when investors 
                                                            
5 The PS measure is derived from the liquidity measures of individual stocks listed on the NYSE and the Amex. 
One concern is that hedge funds do not trade only U.S. equities. However, there is mounting evidence that 
liquidity is correlated across stock and bond markets (Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005; and Goyenko 
and Ukhov, 2009) and across countries (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2010). Therefore, the PS measure could 
reflect a general state of liquidity that encompasses markets other than just the NYSE and the Amex. 
6 There are many ways to capture liquidity risk. Because my goal is to relate liquidity risk to fire sales at hedge 
funds, liquidity risk measures derived from the temporary component of price impact such as the PS measure 
are more appropriate. Other measures of liquidity risk derived from price impact, such as that proposed by 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), do not distinguish between temporary and permanent components of price 
changes accompanying order flow. Nonetheless, I show in robustness checks that the results are qualitatively 
similar when I employ the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity measure. 
7 In a robustness test, to allow for hedge fund exposure to equity option–based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 
2001), I also augment the model with two out–of–the–money Standard and Poor’s 500 option–based factors 
from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model. These factors were generously supplied by Narayan Naik. 
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deploy and redeem capital. On average, hedge funds that experience high inflows 
subsequently outperform hedge funds that experience low inflows by 4.79%  per year (t–
statistic = 4.70) after accounting for co–variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) model. These results are robust to adjustments for backfill and incubation bias, fund 
fees, and thin trading–induced serial correlation in fund returns (Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov, 2004).  
Consistent with a fire sale story, liquidity risk amplifies the effects of capital flows on 
fund returns, both in the cross–section and inter–temporally. Within the fund quintile with the 
highest exposure to liquidity risk, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 4.97% per year. 
Conversely, within the fund quintile with the lowest exposure to liquidity risk, the spread is 
2.84% per year. When the markets are bereft of liquidity, i.e., when the PS measure falls 
below its 20th percentile level, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 9.13% per year. When 
markets are flushed with liquidity, i.e., when the PS measure rises above its 80th percentile 
level, the spread is only -1.48% per year. In addition, the spread is particularly large for 
months that are anecdotally associated with sharp contractions in market liquidity. For 
example, in August 1998, during the Long–Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis, the 
annualized abnormal spread was 24.57%. More recently, in March 2008 with the demise of 
Bear Stearns and in September 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the annualized 
abnormal spreads were 8.57% and 6.37%, respectively.  
In line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), individual hedge fund flows are more 
impactful when economy–wide funding liquidity is tight. I show that the abnormal flow 
portfolio spread is higher when the TED (Treasury–Eurodollar) spread is wide, net repo 
volume is low, prime broker stock returns are poor, and aggregate hedge fund flows are 
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sparse.8 These results also resonate with Shleifer and Vishny (1992). When aggregate funding 
liquidity is tight, fire sales are more likely because there are few ready buyers when hedge 
funds need to sell their specialized assets (e.g., distressed debt, convertible bonds, etc.). 
Leverage also heightens the impact of fund flow on returns. The flow portfolio abnormal 
spread for funds employing leverage is 1.6 times that for funds eschewing leverage. 
Moreover, cross–sectional regression estimates indicate that the findings are driven more by 
outflows than by inflows.  These conditional results are more in keeping with the fire sale 
story than with the Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) smart money effect. It is hard to 
understand why investors would be more prescient for leveraged funds, for funds that 
embrace liquidity risk, during a liquidity crunch, and when redeeming capital.  
What drives excessive liquidity risk–taking? If excessive liquidity risk primarily 
benefits managers at the expense of investors, it should be related to fund agency problems. 
Hence, I ask whether the return impact of flows is stronger for funds that are prone to agency 
problems. I posit that small funds, funds with low–powered managerial incentives, and funds 
serviced by multiple prime brokers are most susceptible to agency issues. Small funds tend to 
face greater pressures to raise capital than do large funds, which could well be grappling with 
capacity constraints. Moreover, according to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) and 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), incentive fees, manager option deltas, and manager co–
investment help align the interests of fund managers with those of their investors.9 In 
addition, by engaging multiple prime brokers, a fund prevents prime brokers from effectively 
monitoring counterparty risk because each prime broker is not privy to its entire portfolio. In 
                                                            
8 Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) employ these economy–wide funding liquidity measures to study the impact 
of adverse funding liquidity shocks on the probability of return contagion across hedge fund styles. 
9 The incentive fee contract can be viewed as a call option written by investors on the assets under management, 
in which the strike price is determined by the net asset value at which different investors enter the fund, as well 
as the hurdle rate and high–water mark provisions. I follow Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) and define 
manager option delta as the sensitivity of that option value to a 1% change in asset value. 
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keeping with an agency explanation, I find that the flow portfolio spread is most pronounced 
for funds with few assets under management, low incentive fees, depressed manager option 
deltas, no manager capital co–invested, and multiple prime brokers.   
Overall, the results suggest that an asset–liability mismatch exists in the hedge fund 
industry. In doing so, I build on the following themes. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that 
coordinated demand shocks by mutual funds experiencing investor outflows create 
substantial price pressure in the stocks that they hold. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) 
find that, in 2005, large capital redemptions by investors in convertible arbitrage funds 
caused the prices of convertible bonds to deviate significantly from theoretical values. I 
extend their work and show that, as a result of excessive liquidity risk–taking at hedge funds, 
even uncoordinated investor demand shocks can engender fire sales at hedge funds. Bollen 
and Poole (2008, 2009) contend that hedge fund managers avoid reporting losses to attract 
and retain investors. I show that hedge funds, especially those that are susceptible to agency 
issues, tend to load up excessively on liquidity risk so as to generate impressive returns and 
draw investor capital. Aragon (2007) argues that share restrictions allow hedge fund 
managers to efficiently manage illiquid assets and those benefits are captured by investors in 
the form of a share illiquidity premium. My analysis suggests that hedge funds do not always 
choose to use share restrictions to manage systematic liquidity risk exposure.  
This paper also adds to recent work that relates liquidity to hedge funds. Patton and 
Ramadorai (2010) find that some hedge funds condition their non liquidity risk exposures on 
daily measures of market liquidity. Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2010) argue that hedge funds 
can successfully time their liquidity risk exposures. Aragon and Strahan (2010) demonstrate 
that the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a funding liquidity crisis that caused stocks 
traded by Lehman–connected funds to experience declines in market liquidity. Boyson, 
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Stahel, and Stulz (2010) examine the effects of funding liquidity shocks on contagion across 
hedge fund styles. This paper builds on seminal work by Sadka (2010), who shows that 
liquidity risk can explain the cross–section of hedge fund returns. Unlike these papers, I focus 
on excessive liquidity risk–taking by hedge funds and how that is related to fire sales and 
agency problems. My findings indicate that, ex post, redemption gates are helpful in 
preventing further flow–induced deterioration in hedge fund performance. However, ex ante, 
gates could encourage hedge funds, especially those that are prone to agency problems, to 
take on more liquidity risk than they should, exacerbating the asset–liability mismatch. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and methodology used. 
Section 3 presents tests of hedge fund liquidity, and Section 4 offers tests of hedge fund 
flows. Section 5 explores the relationship between agency problems and excessive liquidity 
risk. Section 6 reports results from robustness tests, including a correction for sample 
selection bias. Section 7 concludes.   
2. Data and methodology 
I evaluate the liquidity of hedge funds using monthly net–of–fee returns and assets 
under management data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS and HFR datasets 
from January 1990 to December 2008.10 Because TASS and HFR started distributing their 
data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information on funds that died before December 
1993. This gives rise to survivorship bias. I mitigate this bias by focusing on data from 
January 1994 onward. 
 In my fund universe, I have a total of 11,701 hedge funds, of which 4,979 are live 
funds and 6,722 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share 
                                                            
10 The results are robust to using pre–fee returns. 
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classes could cloud the analysis, I exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.11 This 
leaves a total of 8,251 hedge funds, of which 3,237 are live funds and 5,014 are dead funds. 
The funds are roughly evenly split between TASS and HFR. While 2,382 funds appear in 
both databases, many funds belong to only one database. Specifically, there are 2,609 funds 
and 3,260 funds peculiar to the TASS and HFR databases, respectively. This highlights the 
advantage of obtaining data from more than one source. 
 Other than monthly return and size information, my sample also captures data on fund 
characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, redemption frequency, notification 
period, investment style, fund leverage indicator, and fund minimum investment. Because 
minimum investments are sometimes quoted in currencies other than the US dollar, I convert 
all minimum investments to US dollars using exchange rates on December 31, 2008, so as to 
facilitate meaningful comparison. I classify those funds that allow for monthly redemptions 
or better as funds granting favorable redemption terms.12 The analysis centers on these 5,015 
funds, which constitute roughly 60% of my hedge fund universe.  
 Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), I classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi–process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued 
securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take 
positions in equity markets. Multi–process funds employ multiple strategies that take 
advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin–offs, 
mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. 
                                                            
11 Inferences do not change when I include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis. 
12 The baseline results are robust to requiring that funds also have a redemption notice period that is equal to or 
less than a month. The reason is that 86% of the funds that allow for redemptions on a monthly basis or better 
also have redemption notice periods that are equal to or less than a month. Within my sample of liquid funds, 
the majority (83%) allow for redemptions on a monthly basis. 
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Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, 
equities, and bonds in the futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on 
spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. 
Table 1 breaks down the funds in the sample by investment strategy and reports the 
redemption frequency distribution as well as the number of live and dead funds in each 
strategy. It is clear from Table 1 that the majority of funds across most investment styles 
allow for redemptions on a monthly basis or better.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh, 2000; 2009). These 
biases stem from the fact that, due to the lack of regulation amongst hedge funds, inclusion in 
hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a result, there is a self–selection bias. For instance, 
funds often undergo an incubation period in which they rely on internal funding before 
seeking capital from outside investors. Incubated funds with successful track records then go 
on to list in various hedge fund databases while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an 
incubation bias.  Separate from this, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data 
prior to the listing date. Again, because successful funds have a strong incentive to list and 
attract capital inflows, these backfilled returns tend to be higher than the non backfilled 
returns. In the analysis that follows, I will repeat the tests after dropping the first 12 months 
of return data from each fund so as to ensure that the results are robust to backfill and 
incubation bias.   
Throughout this paper, I model the non–liquidity related risks of hedge funds using 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven–factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess 
return on the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor 
(SCMLC) constructed as the difference between the Wilshire small and large capitalization 
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stock indices; the yield spread of the US ten–year Treasury bond over the three–month 
Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of the ten–year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit 
spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the ten–year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted 
for duration (BAAMTSY); and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options 
on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are 
constructed to replicate the maximum possible return from trend following strategies (see 
Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets.13 These seven factors have been 
shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund 
returns.  
To proxy for market liquidity, I employ the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate 
monthly innovation in liquidity measure [see their Eq. (8)].14 Their monthly market–wide 
liquidity measure, an average of individual stock measures estimated with daily stock data, 
relies on the principle that order flow induces greater return reversals when liquidity is lower. 
The PS measure is particularly relevant for my purposes because the price impact of asset fire 
sales, as envisaged by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), is transitory and unrelated to information. 
The liquidity measure exhibits downward spikes corresponding to months anecdotally 
associated with sharp contractions in liquidity. For example, the liquidity measure is 
particularly low in October 1997 at the height of Asian financial crisis, in September 1998 
following the Russian ruble default and the problems at Long–Term Capital Management 
(Lowenstein, 2000), in March 2008 when Bear Stearns collapsed, and in September 2008 
when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 
                                                            
13 David Hsieh kindly supplied these risk factors. The trend following factors can be downloaded from 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-Fac.xls. 
14 Lubos Pástor generously provided the data on the liquidity measure.  The liquidity measure can be 
downloaded from http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research. 
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The PS measure is derived from the liquidity measures of individual stocks listed on 
the NYSE and the Amex. One concern is that hedge funds do not trade only US equities. 
However, mounting evidence exists that liquidity is correlated across stock and bond markets 
(Chordia, Sarkar, Subrahmanyam, 2005; and Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009) and across 
countries (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2010). Therefore, the PS measure could reflect a 
general state of liquidity that encompasses markets other than just the NYSE and the Amex. 
3. Tests of hedge fund liquidity 
To begin, I study the liquidity risk appetites of hedge funds that grant favorable 
redemption terms to their investors. This sets the stage for the analysis of the return impact of 
capital flows that follows.  
3.1. Portfolio sorts 
 In this effort, I follow the approach used in Section III B of Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) and construct portfolios of hedge funds based on their historical liquidity risk 
exposure.  Every January 1, starting in 1997, ten hedge fund portfolios are formed based on 
fund historical Pástor and Stambaugh liquidity beta. Fund historical liquidity beta is 
estimated in the presence of the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, using the past 
36 months of data and for funds with at least 30 months of return information. The post–
formation returns on these decile portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across years 
to form a single return series for each portfolio. I then evaluate the performance of the decile 
portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The alpha of the spread between 
portfolio 1 (high liquidity beta funds) and portfolio 10 (low liquidity beta funds) represents 
the dispersion in expected returns, as a result of variation in liquidity risk exposure across 
hedge funds, that is not captured by exposures to other factors. 
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 The results, reported in Table 2, reveal substantial differences in expected returns, on 
the portfolios sorted by historical liquidity beta, that are unexplained by the other factors. The 
return spread, between portfolio 1 and portfolio 10, is economically and statistically 
significant at 5.80% per year (t–statistic = 2.26). As in the rest of the paper, I base statistical 
inferences on White (1980) heteroskedasticity–consistent standard errors. After adjusting for 
co–variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread increases 
marginally to 6.11% per year (t–statistic = 2.58). These results suggest that substantial 
differences exist in liquidity risk exposures within the sample of liquid hedge funds. As a 
result of the cross–sectional variation in liquidity risk exposure, hedge funds that load up 
more on liquidity risk are able to harvest a liquidity risk premium and outperform hedge 
funds that eschew liquidity risk. These results echo those of Sadka (2010), who measures 
liquidity risk using the Sadka (2006) information–driven, permanent–variable component of 
price impact. However, because the price impact of asset fire sales is transitory and unrelated 
to information, I argue that the PS measure is more relevant for my purposes. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.2. Cross–sectional regressions 
One disadvantage of the portfolio–based approach is that it is difficult to 
simultaneously control for fund characteristics that could also affect fund performance. For 
example, smaller hedge funds could partake in illiquid strategies. These funds could 
outperform other funds simply because they are less affected by capacity constraints and not 
because of their higher liquidity risk exposures. To distinguish from such competing 
explanations, I estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross–sectional regressions on monthly 
hedge fund alpha. The independent variables include hedge fund historical liquidity beta as 
well as other hedge fund characteristics that could impact fund performance. Specifically, I 
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first run cross–sectional regressions for each month. Then, I report the time series averages of 
the coefficient estimates and use the time series standard errors of the average slopes to draw 
inferences. The Fama and MacBeth methodology is a convenient and conservative way of 
accounting for potential cross–correlation in residuals. According to Fama and French 
(2002), Fama and MacBeth standard errors are often two to five times the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) standard errors from pooled panel regressions that ignore cross–correlation. 
 Following Carhart (1997), I first calculate monthly fund abnormal return relative to 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. Abnormal return or alpha is calculated as fund excess 
returns minus the factor realizations times loadings estimated over the entire sample period. 
Hence, 
)
10(
miMmiMmiM
miMmiMmiMmiMimim
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BAAMTSYeRETBDdSCMLCcSNPMRFbrALPHA
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where i = 1, …, nfunds, m = 1,…,M, imALPHA  is the abnormal return of fund i for month m, 
and imr  is fund return in excess of the risk–free rate. To facilitate the estimation of fund 
alpha, I include only results for funds with at least 36 months of return data. 
Next, I estimate the following Fama and MacBeth cross–sectional regressions: 
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where LIQBETA is fund historical liquidity beta, PERFFEE is fund performance fee, 
MGTFEE is fund management fee, MININV is minimum investment amount, FUNDAGE is 
fund age in months, FUNDSIZE is fund assets under management, STYLEDUM is investment 
style dummy, and GEODUM is investment region dummy. The historical liquidity betas are 
calculated as in the portfolio sorts. I also estimate regressions on monthly fund returns to 
ensure that the results are not artifacts of the model for performance evaluation. 
 The coefficient estimates on the historical liquidity beta reported in Table 3 
corroborate the portfolio sort results from Subsection 3.1. They reveal a strong positive 
relation between historical liquidity beta and hedge fund performance. This relation holds 
both in a univariate [Eq. (2)] and multivariate setting [Eq. (3)], where I control for various 
fund attributes. After adjusting for return co–variation with the other fund characteristics, a 
one standard deviation increase in liquidity risk exposure engenders a 2.20% per year (t–
statistic = 2.90) increase in fund returns and a 1.64% per year (t–statistic = 2.61) increase in 
fund alpha. The coefficient estimates on the control variables dovetail with prior research. 
Consistent with Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), returns are negatively correlated with fund age. 
Also, in the spirit of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), high performance fee funds 
outperform low performance fee funds.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4. Tests of hedge fund flow 
The results thus far suggest that hedge funds that grant generous redemption terms 
differ significantly in their appetites for liquidity risk. It remains to be shown that these funds 
take on excessive liquidity risk. Theoretical work by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), 
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Morris and Shin (2004) and others, suggests that when funds 
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take on excessive liquidity risk, capital shocks from investors could translate into short–term 
price changes for the underlying assets held by the same funds. Further, given the view 
expressed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that illiquidity amplifies the impact of asset 
fire sales, such effects should be stronger for funds that bear greater liquidity risk and during 
times of low market liquidity and tight funding liquidity.15 In this section, I explore these 
issues by studying the effects of fund flow on subsequent fund performance.   
4.1. Portfolio sorts 
To understand the effects of fund flows on fund performance, I adopt the portfolio–
based approach used in Subsection 3.1 and construct ten portfolios of hedge funds based on 
fund flows last month. The post–formation returns on these decile portfolios during the next 
month are linked across months to form a single return series for each portfolio. I then 
evaluate the performance of the decile portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
model. The alpha of the spread between portfolio 1 (high flow funds) and portfolio 10 (low 
flow funds) represents the dispersion in expected returns, as a result of variation in capital 
flow across hedge funds, that is not captured by exposures to the factors from the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) model. 
The results reported in Table 4 are broadly consistent with the fire sale story. Hedge 
funds that experience strong inflows subsequently outperform hedge funds that experience 
strong outflows by 5.28% per year (t–statistic = 4.92). After adjusting for co–variation with 
the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread decreases somewhat to 4.79% 
per year (t–statistic = 4.70). Fig. 1 illustrates the monthly cumulative abnormal returns 
                                                            
15 See the discussion on liquidity spirals and Fig. 2 in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
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(CARs) from the high flow and low flow portfolios. It indicates that the cumulative spread 
has increased steadily over the sample period.16   
[Insert Table 4 and Fig. 1 here] 
Concerns arise that the flow portfolio sort results could be due to hedge fund self–
selection biases, serial correlation in hedge fund returns induced by thin trading, or the 
imputation of fund fees. Funds with high net inflows could backfill or incubate their returns 
more than funds with low net inflows. Further, serial correlation in fund returns could arise 
from linear interpolation of prices for infrequently traded securities, the use of smoothed 
broker dealer quotes, or, in some cases, deliberate performance smoothing behavior. This 
coupled with return chasing behavior by hedge fund investors could drive the results from my 
flow portfolio sort. Finally, funds with high net inflows could charge lower fees and hence 
earn higher returns on a post–fee basis. To allay such concerns, I redo the portfolio sorts after 
adjusting for backfill and incubation bias by removing the first 12 months of return data for 
each fund, after unsmoothing fund returns using the algorithm of Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov (2004), and after adding back fees to form pre–fee returns. The results from these 
robustness tests are presented in Table 5 and indicate that the superior performance of the 
high inflow fund portfolio is not driven by backfill and incubation bias, thin trading–induced 
serial correlation, or lower fees.17     
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                            
16 For consistency with the sort on fund liquidity beta (Table 2), I evaluate the flow portfolio sort from January 
1997 to December 2008. The results are just as strong for the flow portfolio sort with an evaluation period 
starting in January 1994. 
17 There are also concerns that hedge funds that are very small are less relevant to large institutional investors. 
Hence I redo the sorts after removing funds with assets under management less than US$20 million. The sort 
results are virtually unchanged with this adjustment, suggesting that they are not driven solely by the smallest 
funds. 
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Yet another concern is that the results in Table 4 could be a manifestation of the smart 
money effect (Gruber, 1996; and Zheng, 1999) or the idea that investors can correctly predict 
the performance of hedge funds. According to the smart money hypothesis, prescient 
investors invest in funds that subsequently outperform and redeem from funds that 
subsequently under–perform. However, if investors are truly smart, they should be able to 
predict fund performance several months or a year in advance, and not just one or two 
months ahead. To investigate, I insert a gap of two months between the formation and 
evaluation periods. I sort funds at the start of every month into decile portfolios based on 
fund flow three months ago and hold for one month. The spread between portfolios 1 and 10 
is no longer statistically different from zero with the two–month gap.18 This suggests that the 
effects of fund flow on fund performance are transient (i.e., dissipating within a quarter) and 
are more in keeping with the fire sale story than with the smart money effect.19 This also 
indicates that my findings are not due to fundamental differences between the securities held 
by funds experiencing subscriptions and those held by funds facing redemptions.20 
If the flow portfolio spread is driven by the return impact of asset fire sales, then it 
should be more pronounced when market liquidity is low and for funds that take on greater 
liquidity risk. To investigate, I sort the sample months into five states based on market 
liquidity, using the PS measure as a proxy, and plot in Panel A of Fig. 2 the average flow 
                                                            
18 When I insert a gap of one month between the formation and evaluation period, the flow portfolio spread 
decreases to 3.37% per year but is still statistically significant at the 5% level. After adjusting for co–variation 
with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, it falls marginally to 3.18% per year. 
19 The counterargument is that investors are smart but, due to the diseconomies of scale envisaged by Berk and 
Green (2004), inflows predict returns only in the short term. The spread alpha narrows from 4.79 to 0.93% per 
annum with the inclusion of the two–month gap between the formation and evaluation periods. In unreported 
results, I show that capacity constraints can explain only 0.15% of this 3.86% reduction in annualized spread 
alpha. Hence, it is unlikely that accumulated flows are responsible for the transience of the flow portfolio 
spread. These results are available upon request. 
20 Sapp and Tiwari (2004) show that, for mutual funds, the stock momentum phenomenon shown by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) can explain the smart money effect. To side–step the stock momentum story, I augment the 
hedge fund factor model with the MOM factor culled from Kenneth French’s website and redo the flow 
portfolio sorts. The resultant spread alpha is virtually identical to that reported in Table 4 and indicates that the 
impact of fund flow on fund performance is unrelated to stock momentum.  
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portfolio abnormal spreads for the various states. I average the middle three states to 
minimize noise and better showcase the general trend. I find that the spread between the high 
and low flow portfolios is exceptionally high when market liquidity is low. Specifically, 
when market liquidity falls below its 20th percentile level, the average annualized abnormal 
spread is 9.13%. In contrast, the average annualized abnormal spread when market liquidity 
rises above its 80th percentile level is only -1.48%. The difference in average abnormal 
spreads between these two states is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 
Moreover, the abnormal spread is particularly large for months anecdotally associated 
with sharp contractions in market liquidity. For example, in October 1997, at the height of the 
Asian financial crisis, the abnormal spread was 24.01% per year. In August 1998 when 
Russia defaulted on the ruble and triggered a massive liquidity crunch that decimated Long–
Term Capital Management (Lowenstein, 2000), the annualized abnormal spread was 24.57%. 
More recently, in March 2008 when Bear Stearns collapsed and in September of 2008 with 
the demise of Lehman Brothers, the annualized abnormal spreads were 8.57% and 6.37%, 
respectively. Taken together, these results dovetail with the view expressed by Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009) that the effects of fire sales should be heightened when market liquidity 
is low. They also cast further doubt on the smart money effect because it is hard to 
understand why investors would be more prescient when markets are bereft of liquidity. 
Thus far I have shown that the impact of fire sales is linked to the intertemporal 
variation in market liquidity. Does the cross–sectional variation in fund market liquidity 
exposure also heighten the impact of fund flows on fund returns? To investigate, I sort the 
funds first into quintiles based on historical liquidity risk exposure and then sort again into 
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quintiles based on fund flow.21 Panels A and B of Table 6 report the flow portfolio sort 
results for funds whose historical liquidity risk exposures lie above the 80th percentile and 
below the 20th percentile, respectively. Consistent with the hypothesis that market liquidity 
should reinforce the effects of capital flow, I find that the flow portfolio spread is higher for 
funds that embrace liquidity risk than for funds that eschew liquidity risk. After accounting 
for co–variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the flow portfolio 
spread within the fund quintile with the highest exposure to liquidity risk is 4.97% per year 
(t–statistic = 2.43). In contrast, the corresponding flow portfolio spread within the fund 
quintile with the lowest exposure to liquidity risk is only 2.84% per year (t–statistic = 1.35).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1992), in a corporate finance setting, asset fire 
sales are more likely when financial distress clusters by industry. Hence, in a capital markets 
setting, the effects of individual fund flows should be most pronounced when economy–wide 
funding liquidity is tight. This is because, when aggregate funding liquidity is low, hedge 
funds that need to sell their specialized assets (e.g., convertible bonds, distressed debt, etc.) to 
cater for investor redemptions are not able to find ready buyers as other hedge funds are also 
facing redemptions or margin calls. Similarly, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that 
economy–wide funding liquidity shocks, in the form of increased margins, can reinforce the 
impact of investor demand shocks.  
To investigate the impact of aggregate funding liquidity on the flow abnormal spread, 
I sort the months in the sample into five states based on the TED spread, net repo volume, 
aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns. The TED spread is the 
                                                            
21 I sort funds into quintiles during each stage of the double sort due to concerns that a ten–by–ten sort results in 
too few funds per group to form statistical inferences. 
20 
 
Treasury–Eurodollar spread culled from the Federal Reserve website. Net repo volume is the 
difference between overnight repurchase and reverse repurchase volume constructed from 
weekly data supplied by Tobias Adrian of the Federal Reserve. Aggregate hedge fund flows 
are total percentage flows from the funds in my sample. Prime broker stock returns are the 
equally weighted stock returns of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, UBS AG, 
Bank of America, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
and Bank of New York Mellon, adjusted for mergers and bankruptcy returns. A widening of 
the TED spread is typically associated with higher borrowing costs (Gupta and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000). Net repo volume is related to funding liquidity and dealer leverage 
(Adrian and Fleming, 2005). Poor performance of prime brokers could translate into higher 
margins for their hedge funds clients as prime brokers cut down on risk. Boyson, Stahel, and 
Stulz (2010) employ these measures to show that contagion across hedge fund styles 
increases when funding liquidity is tight. I scale the TED spread and net repo volume by their 
respective past 36–month standard deviations to adjust for time varying volatility in these 
series.22 I show in Panels B – E of Fig. 2 that the flow portfolio abnormal spread rises when 
aggregate funding liquidity is tight. For example, the spread is exceptionally high when net 
repo volume, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker index returns fall below their 
respective 20th percentile levels. Also, the flow abnormal spread increases steadily as the 
TED spread widens.23   
Leverage is another factor that compounds the effects of investor flow. Given the 
same dollar outflow, funds that employ leverage will have to liquidate a greater dollar 
amount of assets than funds that shun leverage. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that 
                                                            
22 Inferences remain unchanged when I use the raw measures of the TED spread and net repo volume. 
23 In the spirit of Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010), I also condition the flow portfolio abnormal spread on the 
return of the MSCI World Commercial Bank Index. Consistent with the prior results on funding liquidity, I find 
a negative relation between the abnormal spread and commercial bank index returns.  
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leveraged speculators are susceptible to a margin spiral if margins are increasing in market 
illiquidity. In the margin spiral, a funding shock to speculators lowers market liquidity, 
leading to higher margins, which tightens speculators’ funding constraints further, and so on. 
To explore the effects of leverage on hedge fund fire sales, I redo the flow portfolio sorts for 
leveraged funds and non leveraged funds separately, and report the results in Panels C and D 
of Table 6. After accounting for co–variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) model, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 3.72% per year (t–statistic = 4.36) for 
funds employing leverage and only 2.32% per year (t–statistic = 2.01) for funds eschewing 
leverage. Clearly, leverage amplifies the effects of capital flows on hedge fund performance.  
The Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure is derived from liquidity 
measures of individual stocks. Therefore, such a liquidity measure should be most relevant 
for hedge funds trading in equity markets. It would be interesting to check whether the 
conditional liquidity results (Panel A of Fig. 2 and Panels A and B of Table 6) apply to these 
funds as well. In that effort, I redo the conditional liquidity analyses for equity long/short and 
security selection funds. The results also hold funds within these investment strategy groups. 
For example, within the security selection fund group, the average annualized flow portfolio 
abnormal spread is 11.73% when liquidity lies below its 20th percentile level and is 0.58% 
when liquidity rises above its 80th percentile level. Within the same group, the annualized 
abnormal spread is 8.76% for funds with liquidity risk greater than the 80th percentile versus 
2.38% for funds with liquidity risk lower than the 20th percentile.    
Because the fire sale effect is transient in nature, it is important that the portfolios 
feature short formation and evaluation horizons as well as frequent rebalancing. Nonetheless, 
one concern is that the monthly holding horizon of the baseline flow portfolio sort is not 
implementable in practice. To better gauge the economic and practical significance of the fire 
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sale effect, I sort funds based on last month’s fund flow but hold for one quarter and 
rebalance every month. This implies that at any time, each portfolio is made up of three 
subportfolios: the first formed based on fund flow one month ago, the second formed based 
on fund flow two months ago, and the third formed based on fund flow three months ago. 
Given the longer average time lag between the formation and evaluation periods, it is not 
surprising that the flow portfolio spread alpha diminishes to 2.76% per annum. Nonetheless, 
the spread alpha is still statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also reassuring that the 
alpha of the top flow decile remains economically and statistically significant at 4.98% per 
annum (t–statistic = 4.23) with this adjustment. 
4.2. Cross–sectional regressions 
To ascertain that the flow portfolio results are not driven by other hedge fund 
characteristics, I estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross–sectional regressions on hedge 
fund performance. The cross–sectional regressions also allow me to control for the 
explanatory power of past fund performance on flows and separately measure the effects of 
inflows and outflows on fund returns. In the absence of a cash buffer, hedge funds that grant 
favorable redemption terms have to quickly liquidate in response to outflows. Conversely, 
funds experiencing inflows do not have to immediately increase their positions as the new 
capital could be kept as cash in the interim. This suggests that one should observe a stronger 
return effect with outflows than with inflows. 
To investigate, I re–estimate the Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) regressions with two additional 
independent variables: FLOW_POS and FLOW_NEG. The variable FLOW_POS equals last 
month’s fund flow when flow is positive and equals zero otherwise, and FLOW_NEG equals 
last month’s fund flow when flow is negative and equals zero otherwise. The coefficient 
estimates on FLOW_POS and FLOW_NEG capture the return effects of fund inflow and 
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outflow, respectively. I also include, as a control, last month’s fund return or fund alpha to 
account for the explanatory power of fund performance on flow.24 Finally, for completeness, 
I also estimate regressions with last month’s fund flow in place of FLOW_POS and 
FLOW_NEG.  
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 7 indicate that consistent with a priori 
intuition, fund outflows exert a stronger impact on subsequent returns than do fund inflows. 
This conclusion holds whether I control for other fund characteristics or not. After adjusting 
for return co–variation with the other fund characteristics, a one standard deviation increase 
in fund outflow decreases fund returns by 2.05% per year. The coefficient estimates on 
FLOW_NEG are statistically significant at the 1% level across all regression specifications. 
By comparison, the coefficient estimates on FLOW_POS are about half the magnitude of 
those on FLOW_NEG and are statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 5% level, at least 
for the regression on monthly alpha with controls. As in Subsection 4.1, I perform robustness 
tests with fund alpha adjusted for backfill and incubation bias, with alpha derived from 
unsmoothed returns, and with pre–fee alpha. The results are again broadly supportive of the 
view that the effects of fund flow on returns are driven more by redemptions than by 
subscriptions.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
One way to further distinguish from the smart money story is to explore cross–fund 
effects in a regression setting. For fund x, do inflows into other funds operating similar 
strategies also affect the returns of fund x? To investigate, for each fund, I identify other 
similar funds based on pair–wise return correlations over the past 36 months. Specifically, 
given fund x and a group size of N, the group is the N other funds whose returns are most 
                                                            
24 The results are robust to including fund return or fund alpha lagged two months as a control as well. 
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correlated with those of fund x. I experiment with groups of 30, 50, and 80 funds. Next, I 
define the group flow variable as the equal–weighted flow of the funds in the same group, 
and augment the independent variables in the Table 7 regressions on monthly alpha with 
group flow. The coefficient estimates on group flow are positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level for all regression specifications and group sizes, suggesting that my findings 
are not driven by the smart money effect.  
5. Agency and the asset–liability mismatch 
 What drives excessive liquidity risk–taking amongst hedge funds? If excessive 
liquidity risk primarily benefits hedge fund managers, via capital accumulation and fee 
generation, at the expense of investors, it must be related to principal agent problems at the 
fund level. Therefore, I hypothesize that the return impact of fund flows is amplified for 
funds that have strong incentives to raise capital, funds whose managers’ interests are less 
aligned with those of their investors, and funds that are serviced by multiple prime brokers. 
The last point follows from the view that, to manage counterparty risk, prime brokers are 
incentivized to monitor the risk–taking activities of their hedge fund clients. When a fund 
employs more than one prime broker, it becomes much harder for each prime broker to 
independently monitor the fund because the prime broker cannot see the fund’s entire 
portfolio.  
 To test whether fund incentives to raise capital shape excessive liquidity risk–taking, I 
perform double sorts on fund assets under management and net inflows last month. Small 
funds typically need to raise enough capital to attain critical mass. Conversely, large funds 
often grapple with diseconomies of scale and might not benefit as much from additional 
capital infusions. Goeztmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) show that large funds are less 
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willing to take in new money than small funds. It seems reasonable to posit that small funds 
face greater pressures to raise capital than do large funds. Panels A and B of Table 8 report 
results from one such double sort on size and fund flow. The flow portfolio spread is 
somewhat higher for funds with below median assets under management than for funds with 
above median assets under management. Sharper differences are observed for funds at the 
extreme ends of the size spectrum. As shown in Panels C and D of Table 8, the flow portfolio 
spread for funds with assets under management below the 20th percentile is 2.3 times that for 
funds with assets under management above the 80th percentile. These results are consistent 
with the view that funds with strong incentives to raise capital take on excessive liquidity risk 
so as to boost returns and attract investors.     
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 here] 
 Next, I test whether funds whose managers’ interests are less aligned with those of 
their investors are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. According to Goetzmann, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), performance fees help minimize principal agent problems by 
matching managers’ interests with those of their investors. Therefore, I sort funds into high 
and low performance fee groups and redo the flow portfolio sort within these fund groups. 
While the vast majority of funds in the sample charge a performance fee of 20% per annum, 
roughly 21% of funds charge performance fees below the median while 6.8% of funds levy 
performance fees above the median. In Panels A and B of Table 9, I show that the flow 
portfolio spread is particularly large for funds with performance fees below 20% per annum 
consistent with the intuition that, for these funds, the interests of managers and investors are 
least aligned.25 
                                                            
25 One can also argue that funds with a greater percentage management fee should have a stronger incentive to 
raise capital. Consistent with this intuition, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is higher (3.23% versus 2.10% 
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 Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) argue that the performance fee does not fully 
capture managerial incentives, as two different managers that charge the same performance 
fee could be facing different dollar incentives depending on the timing and magnitude of 
investor’s capital flows and fund’s return history. They recognize, as in Goetzmann, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), that the performance fee contract is a call option written by the 
investors on the assets under management, where the strike price is determined by the net 
asset values at which different investors enter the fund, as well as by the hurdle rate and 
high–water mark provisions. Hence, I redo the analysis using manager option delta as defined 
in Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).  Manager option delta is calculated 
using the formula of Black and Scholes (1973) for valuing European call options and is 
simply the sensitivity of the option value to a 1% change in asset value. The results are 
reported in Panels C and D of Table 9. Consistent with the idea that manager option delta 
better captures managerial incentives, I find that the difference in flow portfolio spread 
between less aligned and more aligned funds widens when I use manager option delta to 
measure alignment. Specifically, the annualized risk–adjusted flow portfolio spread for funds 
with low manager option deltas is 5.07% greater than that for funds with high manager option 
deltas. Conversely, the annualized risk–adjusted flow portfolio spread for funds with low 
performance fees is only 1.49% greater than that for funds with high performance fees. In the 
analysis, I focus on manager option delta as opposed to the total delta of Agarwal, Daniel, 
and Naik (2009), as the former can be calculated without having to make assumptions on how 
managers re–invest their incentive fees. The results weaken but remain qualitatively similar 
when I use total delta instead of manager option delta. The annualized risk–adjusted flow 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
per annum) for funds with management fees above the median than for funds with management fees below the 
median. The median management fee in my fund sample is 1.5% per annum.  
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portfolio spread for funds with low total deltas is 3.21% greater than that for funds with high 
total deltas.   
 Another way to gauge alignment of interests is to examine manager co–investment. 
Relative to managers who do not co–invest, managers who invest personal capital in their 
funds are more likely to act in the best interests of their investors. The TASS database 
includes an indicator variable for manager co–investment. Within the TASS sample, I find 
that the flow portfolio spread is attenuated when managers co–invest personal capital in their 
fund. As reported in Panels A and B of Table 10, for such funds, the risk–adjusted flow 
portfolio spread is only 2.22% per year. In contrast, for funds without manager co–
investment, the corresponding spread is 3.47% per year and is statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 Lastly, I explore the relation between excessive liquidity risk–taking and the number 
of prime brokers employed by a fund. Consistent with my intuition, I find that flows impact 
returns more for funds serviced by multiple prime brokers than for funds serviced by a single 
prime broker. As reported in Panels C and D of Table 10, the risk–adjusted flow portfolio 
spread is 6.31% per annum for funds with multiple brokers and only 3.06% per annum for 
funds with single brokers. One concern is that funds with multiple brokers could obtain better 
financing. Therefore, higher leverage could drive the larger return spread I observed within 
the multiple–broker fund group. However, when I conduct a triple sort on leverage, number 
of prime brokers, and fund flow, I find that even within the subset of funds that do not 
employ leverage, multiple prime broker funds are still more likely to take on excessive 
liquidity risk than single prime broker funds. The risk–adjusted flow portfolio spread for the 
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former group of funds is 5.52 times that for the latter group of funds. This indicates that the 
prime broker double sort results are not driven by leverage.    
 Collectively, the results in this section suggest that agency problems at hedge funds 
are linked to excessive liquidity risk–taking. Fund managers who have greater incentives to 
raise capital, whose incentives are less aligned with those of their investors, and who engage 
multiple prime brokers are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. This, in turn, 
translates into a larger return impact when investors redeem or deploy capital. These results 
also suggest that because my return impact measure is closely linked to fund agency 
problems, it is capturing liquidity risk–taking that is excessive from the point of view of the 
investor. 
 
6. Robustness and sample selection 
In this section, I present a series of tests to ascertain the robustness of the results. 
6.1. The firm effect 
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure, while accounting for correlations between 
observations on different funds in the same month, does not account for the firm effect or the 
correlation between observations of the same fund across different months. According to 
Petersen (2009), in the presence of the firm effect, standard errors clustered by firm (Rogers, 
1993) are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals. The firm effect could be 
present in hedge fund data given that hedge fund returns are often serially correlated. To 
address this issue, I estimate the pooled OLS versions of the regressions in Table 7 with 
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White (1980) standard errors clustered by fund. The results are reported in Columns 1 and 4 
of Table 11 and are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
6.2. Sample selection 
Another critique of the cross–sectional regression analysis in Tables 3 and 7 is that 
fund redemption terms might not be exogenous. Funds could choose to offer favorable 
redemption terms to better compete for capital from investors. Therefore, fund redemption 
terms could be linked to variables known at inception that are related to fund propensity and 
ability to raise capital. The coefficients in Tables 3 and 7 that supposedly explain the 
variation in hedge fund performance could be contaminated by correlation between the 
residuals in these cross–sectional regressions and the unobserved factors that shape fund 
redemption terms. To ameliorate these issues, I follow Ramadorai (2010) and employ the 
Heckman (1979) two–stage procedure to correct for possible sample selection bias. To apply 
the procedure, I first estimate a probit regression on the entire universe of hedge funds to 
determine the factors underlying selection. The inverse Mills ratio is then computed from this 
first stage probit and incorporated into the regression on hedge fund performance so as to 
correct for selection bias.  
To implement the Heckman correction, a critical identifying assumption is that some 
variables explain selection, but not hedge fund performance. If there is no such exclusion 
restriction, the model is identified by only distributional assumptions about the residuals, 
which could lead to problems in estimating the parameters of the model.  The exclusion 
restriction that I employ is fund inception family size. Funds started by large fund families 
could find it easier to offer favorable redemption terms as they have access to a larger pool of 
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investor capital and, having cultivated relationships with choice prime brokers, can take 
advantage of lower borrowing costs. At the same time, it is unlikely that family size at 
inception significantly affects fund performance several months post inception. Other 
variables that determine selection could include management fee and performance fee. Funds 
with high management fees and low performance fees have strong incentives to raise capital 
and could therefore offer more attractive redemption terms to lure investors.    
The results from the Heckman correction are reported in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 of 
Table 11. The coefficient estimates from the selection equation (Columns 2 and 5) confirm 
the intuition that funds with strong incentives to raise capital and that can tap into large 
capital pools choose to offer favorable redemption terms. The coefficient estimates on 
management fee and fund inception family size are positive while that on performance fee is 
negative. All the coefficients in the selection equation are statistically different from zero at 
the 1% level. In the Heckman model, the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio takes the sign 
of the correlation between the residuals in the regression that explain selection and hedge 
fund performance. In both the regressions on monthly returns and monthly alphas, the 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that hedge 
funds that offer favorable redemption terms are more likely to exhibit high unexplained 
returns and alphas. One view is that, controlling for fund fees and family size, high ability 
fund managers are more likely to grant favorable redemption terms as they believe that 
investors are unlikely to redeem capital given their superior investment skills. Regardless of 
whether this explanation holds true, the coefficient estimates on the liquidity beta and flow 
measures with the correction for sample selection (Columns 3 and 6) are virtually identical to 
those from the pooled OLS regressions (Columns 1 and 4). Moreover, the estimates on the 
liquidity beta and FLOW_NEG variables are statistically different from zero at the 5% level 
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with the Heckman correction, indicating that the prior cross–sectional regression results are 
not tainted by sample selection issues.   
6.3. An alternative measure of liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk can be measured in several ways (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; and Sadka, 2006). Liquidity risk measures derived from the 
temporary component of price impact, such as the PS measure, are most helpful for exploring 
the price impact of investor capital flows on hedge fund returns. Nonetheless, it is important 
to show that my findings are not unique to the liquidity risk measure that I chose.  
In that effort, I replicate the liquidity beta and investor flow sort analyses using the 
illiquidity measure of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) [see their Eq. (22)].26 Their measure, 
which is derived from that proposed by Amihud (2002), does not differentiate between the 
temporary and permanent components of price impact. My results are qualitatively similar 
with their measure. Funds whose returns co–vary most with the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
illiquidity measure under–perform funds whose returns co–vary least with the same measure. 
The top illiquidity beta–fund decile under–performs the bottom illiquidity beta–fund decile 
by 5.39% per year (t–statistic = 2.20) after adjusting for co–variation with the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) factors. Also, as illustrated in Panel F of Fig. 2, the impact of fund flows on 
subsequent fund returns is amplified when illiquidity is high. When the Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) illiquidity measure rises above its 80th percentile level, the annualized flow 
portfolio abnormal spread is 6.85% (t–statistic = 2.31). Conversely, when the illiquidity 
measure falls below its 20th percentile level, the annualized flow portfolio abnormal spread is 
only 0.72%. Finally, capital flows are more impactful for funds that load negatively on the 
                                                            
26 Therefore, I expect the results to be reversed for the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) measure because it 
evaluates illiquidity, unlike the PS measure, which assesses liquidity. 
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illiquidity measure. Within the quintile of funds with the lowest Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
illiquidity beta, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 6.81% per annum (t–statistic = 3.09). In 
contrast, within the quintile of funds with the highest Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity 
beta, the spread is only 2.25% per annum.  
6.4. Dynamic risk exposures 
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios might not stay constant 
over time. As a result, the risk–adjustment for, say, Tables 2 and 4 might not be accurate. To 
account for dynamic factor loadings, I impose structural breaks for October 1998 (LTCM 
crisis) and April 2000 (the height of the Technology bubble), as in Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and 
Ramadorai (2008), and redo the Table 2 and 4 analyses. Even with the structural break 
adjustment, the baseline flow portfolio abnormal spread remains economically and 
statistically significant at 4.21% per annum (t–statistic = 4.40). The abnormal spread from the 
sort on liquidity betas also remains relatively unchanged at 5.89% per annum (t–statistic = 
2.84).  
Another way to account for dynamic risk exposures is to calculate the factor loadings 
using a rolling window approach and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns 
one month forward. When I do that using a 24–month window, I find that the baseline flow 
portfolio abnormal spread remains virtually unchanged at 4.66% per annum (t–statistic = 
4.24). However, the statistical significance of the liquidity beta abnormal spread is somewhat 
more sensitive to the beta estimation technology. With the rolling window approach, the 
liquidity beta abnormal spread falls to 5.55% per annum (t–statistic = 1.95). I believe that the 
reduction in statistical significance stems from the lower degrees of freedom and noisier beta 
estimates associated with the rolling window methodology. Consistent with that explanation, 
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when I group funds into quintiles and redo the rolling window liquidity beta sort, the 
abnormal spread is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
6.5. Additional risk factors 
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud the portfolio sort analysis. Relative 
to low inflow funds, high inflow funds could be loading up more on some risk factor, say, 
emerging markets, that has done well over the sample period. This could explain why there is 
a return spread between high inflow and low inflow funds. Hence, I augment the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) model with an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging 
Markets Index return and redo the sorts for Tables 2 and 4. The flow and liquidity beta 
portfolio spread alphas easily survive the inclusion of the emerging markets factor. After 
accounting for exposure to the emerging markets factor, the aforementioned spread alphas are 
5.03% per annum (t–statistic = 5.05) and 5.88% per annum (t–statistic = 2.68), respectively. 
To cater for hedge fund exposure to option based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001), I 
also augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with out–of–the–money S&P 500 call and 
put option–based factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model. Again, the portfolio 
spread alphas are robust to the inclusion of these two additional risk factors.    
6.6.  Fund termination 
There are concerns that because funds that drop out from the database could have 
terminated their operations, the portfolio alphas could be biased upward. This is because 
when a fund in the portfolio drops out of the database, I take the equal–weighted average 
return of the funds in the portfolio that remain in the database. To allay concerns regarding 
hedge fund termination, I assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of the database, its 
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return is -10%.27 Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. 
With that adjustment, the alphas of the top and bottom flow deciles in Table 4 fall to 5.31% 
and -0.98% per annum, respectively. However, the flow portfolio spread alpha remains 
significant at 6.29% per annum (t–statistic = 6.19). Similarly, the alphas of the top and 
bottom liquidity beta deciles in Table 2 decline to 7.13% and 1.10% per annum, respectively. 
Still, the liquidity beta portfolio spread alpha remains significant at 6.03% per annum (t–
statistic = 2.52). This suggests that the baseline results are robust to the self–reporting and 
delisting biases inherent in hedge fund data. 
6.7.  Fund liquidity 
In this paper, I define liquid funds as those that allow for redemptions on a monthly 
basis or better. However, there are other ways to measure the liquidity of hedge funds vis–à–
vis their investors. The results are also robust to using redemption notice period as a proxy 
for fund liquidity. Within the group of hedge funds with redemption notice periods less than 
or equal to a month, high inflow funds outperform low inflow funds and high liquidity beta 
funds outperform low liquidity beta funds. The annualized flow (Table 4) and liquidity beta 
(Table 2) portfolio spread alphas are 4.85% (t–statistic = 4.73) and 5.51% (t–statistic = 2.51), 
respectively. 
7. Conclusion 
In a world where assets and liabilities are perfectly matched, hedge fund share 
restrictions permit funds to liquidate in an orderly fashion and avoid fire sales. Redemption 
gates are redundant. This paper challenges this view. I show that, given their redemption 
terms, hedge funds often take on greater liquidity risk exposure than they should. They do so 
                                                            
27 I thank the referee for suggesting this termination return. 
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as the rewards to bearing liquidity risks are substantial. Within the group of funds that offer 
favorable redemption terms to their investors, those that embrace liquidity risk harvest 
substantially higher returns than those that shun liquidity risk. As a consequence of the asset–
liability mismatch, for this same group of funds, capital shocks by investors result in 
significant but transient changes to hedge fund returns. Funds that experience high net 
inflows subsequently outperform funds that experience low net inflows by 4.79% per year 
after adjusting for risk. Consistent with a fire sale story, the impact of fund flows is more 
pronounced for funds that take on greater liquidity risk, for funds that employ leverage, when 
market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity is tight. Moreover, excessive liquidity 
risk–taking appears to be prevalent amongst funds that are most susceptible to agency 
problems, suggesting that such behavior benefits fund managers at the expense of investors. 
Therefore, ex post, given the liquidity risk exposures of hedge funds, redemption gates are 
helpful as they allow hedge funds to avoid the deleterious effects of asset fire sales. However, 
ex ante, the option to raise gates could ironically encourage hedge funds to take on greater 
liquidity risk and, in so doing, exacerbate the asset–liability mismatch.    
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Fig. 1: Cumulative abnormal return of high flow versus low flow funds. Portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds every month based on fund flow last
month. Portfolio 1 is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the highest flow decile. Portfolio 10 is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the lowest flow decile.
Cumulative abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by risk factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model.  Factor loadings are estimated over the entire evaluation period, which is from January 1997 to December 2008.
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Panel D: Months grouped by aggregate hedge fund flow
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Panel C: Months grouped by net repo volume
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Panel B: Months grouped by the TED spread
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Panel A: Months grouped by the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure
Fig. 2: Abnormal flow portfolio spread grouped by market liquidity and funding liquidity. Decile portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds every month
based on fund flow last month. The spread return is the return difference between the decile portfolio with the highest flow and the decile portfolio with the lowest flow. The
abnormal spread return is the difference between the spread return and its factor loadings multiplied by risk factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
Factor loadings are estimated over the entire evaluation period. Next, the evaluation period is divided into five states (Q1 to Q5) based on the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)
market-wide liquidity measure, the Treasury-Eurodollar (TED) spread, net repo volume, aggregate hedge fund flows, prime broker (PB) index return, or the Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) illiquidity measure. The average abnormal spreads for the various states are graphed. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008.
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Investment strategy Total funds Dead funds rfreq ≤ 1 month 1 month < rfreq ≤ 3 months 3 months < rfreq ≤ 6 months 6 months < rfreq Return months
Security Selection 3,967 2,286 2,164 1,475 142 186 240,080
Directional Trader 1,617 1,002 1,406 192 12 7 101,569
Relative Value 1,447 972 860 526 34 27 81,756
Multi-process 1,140 682 522 472 33 113 70,365
Others 80 72 63 11 6 0 3,203
Total 8,251 5,014 5,015 2,676 227 333 496,973
Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2008. Funds are grouped according to their primary investment strategy. Security Selection funds take long and short
positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds
employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy
reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the
futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. 
Redemption frequency (rfreq)
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX  PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Portfolio 1 (high liquidity beta) 9.29 3.47 8.47 3.62 0.27 0.24 0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.23
Portfolio 2 6.23 3.22 4.99 3.26 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.38
Portfolio 3 2.81 1.70 1.72 1.54 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.50
Portfolio 4 3.47 2.23 2.36 1.98 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.45
Portfolio 5 2.31 1.65 1.44 1.45 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.49
Portfolio 6 2.70 1.99 2.12 2.18 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.51
Portfolio 7 3.48 2.38 2.73 2.42 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.43
Portfolio 8 2.94 1.75 2.10 1.72 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.47
Portfolio 9 2.84 1.27 2.08 1.31 0.28 0.17 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.49
Portfolio 10 (low liquidity beta) 3.50 1.22 2.36 1.18 0.35 0.28 0.05 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.48
Spread (1–10) 5.80 2.26 6.11 2.58 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.31 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.11
Table 2
Sorts on liquidity beta
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every January 1st into deciles based on their beta with respect to the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate
liquidity measure, estimated over the past 36 months. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
Standard and Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the US ten-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for
duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistic
are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008.
Independent
variable No controls With controls No controls With controls
Liquidity beta 0.0194** 0.0144** 0.0119** 0.0107**
(3.09) (2.90) (2.64) (2.61)
Management fee 0.1012* 0.0887*
(2.09) (2.34)
Performance fee 0.0086* 0.0081*
(2.09) (2.47)
Minimum investment 0.0039 0.0016
(0.77) (0.36)
Fund age in months -0.0029* -0.0038**
(-1.99) (-2.85)
Log (fund size) 0.0036 0.0122
(0.19) (0.73)
Style dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No Yes No Yes
Table 3
Cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund performance
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent
variable is hedge fund monthly return or alpha. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model. In the regressions without controls, the independent variable is the beta on the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)
aggregate liquidity measure estimated over the past 36 months. In the regressions with controls, I also include as
independent variables fund management fee, performance fee, minimum investment, fund age in months, the log of
fund size, as well as investment style and geographical region dummies. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980)
standard errors, are in parentheses. The coefficient estimates on the dummy variables are omitted for brevity. The
evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. *significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
monthly return monthly alpha
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX  PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 7.43 4.23 6.21 4.90 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.48
Portfolio 2 6.42 3.51 5.45 3.87 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.41
Portfolio 3 4.83 2.97 3.91 3.40 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48
Portfolio 4 3.98 2.46 2.90 2.65 0.22 0.17 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.52
Portfolio 5 4.04 2.48 3.26 2.85 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.52
Portfolio 6 4.55 2.94 3.77 3.24 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.45
Portfolio 7 3.52 2.35 2.82 2.75 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.51
Portfolio 8 3.62 2.29 2.89 2.55 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47
Portfolio 9 4.51 2.55 3.68 3.21 0.24 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.56
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 2.15 1.13 1.42 1.09 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.51
Spread (1–10) 5.28 4.92 4.79 4.70 -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.08
Table 4
Sorts on fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted into deciles every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are Standard and Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the US ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's
BAA bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS
(PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to
December 2008.
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET  BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX   PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 6.27 3.55 5.21 4.17 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.49
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 1.17 0.60 0.47 0.34 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48
Spread (1–10) 5.43 4.79 5.96 4.30 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 7.18 3.72 5.76 4.22 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.50
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 1.29 0.62 0.45 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.52
Spread (1–10) 5.88 5.08 6.67 4.98 0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.11
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 12.01 6.71 10.83 8.27 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 6.15 3.19 5.46 4.16 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.51
Spread (1–10) 5.86 5.35 6.53 5.19 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.10
Panel C: Adjusted for fund fees
Table 5
Sorts on fund flow, robustness tests
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted into deciles every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are Standard and Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the US ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA
bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where
PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. Panel A
reports results after removing the first 12 months of returns for each fund to adjust for backfill and incubation bias. Panel B reports results after unsmoothing returns using the
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) algorithm. Panel C reports results after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns.
Panel A: Adjusted for backfill and incubation bias
Panel B: Adjusted for serial correlation
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX  
 
PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 10.92 4.09 9.52 4.33 0.34 0.27 0.14 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.34
Quintile 5 (low flow) 5.52 2.11 4.55 2.16 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.30
Spread (1–5) 5.39 2.62 4.97 2.43 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03
Quintile 1 (high flow) 3.70 1.31 2.19 0.95 0.30 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.35
Quintile 5 (low flow) -0.12 -0.05 -0.64 -0.31 0.29 0.21 -0.04 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.39
Spread (1–5) 3.83 1.82 2.84 1.35 0.02 0.05 0.18 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.72 4.32 6.53 4.75 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.41
Quintile 5 (low flow) 3.68 2.09 2.82 2.34 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50
Spread (1–5) 4.04 4.73 3.72 4.36 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05
Quintile 1 (high flow) 5.46 3.03 4.56 3.69 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.54
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.79 1.32 2.24 1.62 0.28 0.18 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.57
Spread (1–5) 2.66 2.26 2.32 2.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09
Panel D: Funds not employing leverage
Table 6
Double sorts on liquidity risk exposure and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are Standard and Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC),
change in the constant maturity yield of the US ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over
ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is
primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. In Panels A and B,
funds are sorted first into quintiles based on fund liquidity risk exposure and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted first based on whether they
employ leverage and then into quintiles based on fund flow.
Panel A: Funds with high liquidity risk exposure (liquidity beta > 80th percentile)
Panel B: Funds with low liquidity risk exposure (liquidity beta < 20th percentile)
Panel C: Funds employing leverage
Independent
variable
Liquidity beta 0.0176** 0.0175** 0.0132** 0.0132** 0.0120** 0.0119** 0.0104** 0.0104**
(3.34) (3.32) (2.98) (2.97) (2.83) (2.81) (2.70) (2.70)
Fund return last month 0.1352** 0.1354** 0.1202** 0.1204**
(6.10) (6.12) (6.14) (6.16)
Fund alpha last month 0.1143** 0.1145** 0.1063** 0.1067**
(6.96) (6.99) (7.01) (7.05)
Fund flow last month 0.7750** 0.6471** 0.6878** 0.5525**
(4.04) (3.76) (4.00) (3.44)
FLOW_POS 0.6434* 0.5703* 0.6391* 0.4723
(2.01) (2.32) (2.24) (1.93)
FLOW_NEG 1.4522** 1.3230** 1.2793** 1.1735**
(2.84) (2.87) (2.99) (2.75)
Fund characteristics No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Style dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Region dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
No controls With controls No controls With controls
Table 7
Cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund performance with fund flow
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly return or alpha. Alpha is
estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. In the regressions without controls, the independent variables include the beta on the Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003) aggregate liquidity measure estimated over the past 36 months, past fund performance, and measures of fund flow. The variable FLOW_POS is fund flow last month when
flow is positive and is equal to zero otherwise. The variable FLOW_NEG is fund flow last month when flow is negative and is equal to zero otherwise. In the regressions with
controls I also include as independent variables fund management fee, performance fee, minimum investment, fund age in months, the log of fund size, as well as investment style
and geographical region dummies. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The coefficient estimates on the fund characteristics and
dummy variables are omitted for brevity. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. *significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
Monthly alphaMonthly return
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX  PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 8.33 4.49 7.11 5.53 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.51
Quintile 5 (low flow) 4.39 2.31 3.63 2.97 0.25 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.56
Spread (1–5) 3.93 4.21 3.48 3.80 -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Quintile 1 (high flow) 5.58 3.28 4.58 3.50 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.40
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.36 1.33 1.61 1.31 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.50
Spread (1–5) 3.21 3.58 2.97 3.36 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06
Quintile 1 (high flow) 9.60 4.71 8.24 6.12 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.53
Quintile 5 (low flow) 4.81 2.38 4.08 2.98 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.50
Spread (1–5) 4.79 3.17 4.16 2.79 0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Quintile 1 (high flow) 4.85 2.88 3.74 2.90 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.38
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.39 1.32 1.91 1.50 0.24 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.53
Spread (1–5) 2.45 2.20 1.82 1.67 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11
Panel D: Very large funds (assets under management > 80th percentile)
Table 8
Double sorts on assets under management and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are Standard & Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC),
change in the constant maturity yield of the US ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond
over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where
PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. In
Panels A and B, funds are sorted first into two groups based on fund assets under management and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted first
into quintiles based on assets under management and then into quintiles based on fund flow.
Panel A: Small funds (assets under management < 50th percentile)
Panel B: Large funds (assets under management > 50th percentile)
Panel C: Very small funds (assets under management < 20th percentile)
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX  
 
PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 4.90 2.11 3.80 2.65 0.35 0.20 0.12 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.63
Quintile 5 (low flow) 1.70 0.74 0.81 0.53 0.34 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.55
Spread (1–5) 3.21 2.72 2.99 2.48 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.94 3.55 6.51 2.97 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08
Quintile 5 (low flow) 6.42 2.54 5.01 2.11 0.08 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14
Spread (1–5) 1.52 0.68 1.50 0.66 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.22 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.36 3.68 7.03 4.35 0.25 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.35
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.21 0.99 1.71 0.97 0.25 0.15 -0.04 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.35
Spread (1–5) 5.14 2.88 5.32 2.81 0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Quintile 1 (high flow) 2.13 0.80 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.34
Quintile 5 (low flow) 1.32 0.45 -0.13 -0.06 0.26 0.33 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.39
Spread (1–5) 0.81 0.53 0.25 0.17 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06
Panel D: Funds with high manager option deltas (option delta > 80th percentile)
Table 9
Double sorts on fund managerial incentives and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are Standard & Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's
BAA bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS
(PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to
December 2008. In Panels A and B, funds are sorted first based on fund performance fee and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted first
into quintiles based on manager option delta and then into quintiles based on fund flow. Manager option deltas are computed as in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).
Panel A: Funds with low performance fees (performance fee < 20 percent)
Panel B: Funds with high performance fees (performance fee > 20 percent)
Panel C: Funds with low manager option deltas (option delta < 20th percentile)
Portfolio
Excess 
return 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of excess 
return
Alpha 
(percent/ 
year)
t -statistic 
of alpha  SNPMRF  SCMLC    BD10RET BAAMTSY  PTFSBD   PTFSFX  PTFSCOM 
Adjusted 
R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 6.80 3.79 5.70 4.23 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.46
Quintile 5 (low flow) 4.15 2.26 3.49 2.94 0.23 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.55
Spread (1–5) 2.64 2.61 2.22 2.12 -0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05
Quintile 1 (high flow) 6.86 3.70 5.74 4.16 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.42
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.93 1.66 2.27 1.94 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.52
Spread (1–5) 3.93 4.20 3.47 3.85 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.26 3.99 6.04 4.62 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47
Quintile 5 (low flow) 3.62 2.07 2.98 2.60 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.57
Spread (1–5) 3.64 4.06 3.06 3.69 0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Quintile 1 (high flow) 8.96 4.53 8.29 4.43 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14
Quintile 5 (low flow) 3.54 1.28 1.97 0.77 0.18 0.09 0.32 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.20
Spread (1–5) 5.42 2.34 6.31 2.71 -0.12 0.01 -0.29 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07
Panel D: Funds serviced by multiple prime brokers
Table 10
Double sorts on manager capital/number of prime brokers and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are Standard & Poor's 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the US ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's
BAA bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM),
where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008.
In Panels A and B, funds are sorted first based on whether they invest manager capital and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted first based
on whether they are serviced by a single prime broker or by multiple prime brokers and then into quintiles based on fund flow.
Panel A: Funds with manager capital
Panel B: Funds without manager capital
Panel C: Funds serviced by a single prime broker
Independent
variable OLS regression Selection equation Regression equation OLS regression Selection equation Regression equation
Liquidity beta 0.0164** 0.0165** 0.0077** 0.0079**
(6.72) [10.58] (3.67) [6.08]
Fund return last month 0.1477** 0.1476**
(18.41) [36.49]
Fund alpha last month 0.1011** 0.1008**
(12.59) [24.81]
FLOW_POS 0.1382 0.1410 0.1810 0.1844
(0.86) [0.83] (1.27) [1.31]
FLOW_NEG 1.075** 1.0406** 0.6358* 0.5919*
(3.26) [3.67] (2.42) [2.50]
Management fee 0.0360 0.4787** 0.1263* 0.0558* 0.4790** 0.1703**
(1.12) [67.02] [2.57] (1.98) [67.04] [4.15]
Performance fee 0.0077 -0.0278** 0.0008 0.0049 -0.0278** -0.0038
(1.93) [-37.51] [0.19] (1.30) [-37.47] [-1.01]
Minimum investment -0.0048** -0.0047* -0.0040** -0.0039*
(-4.89) [-2.28] (-3.89) [-2.25]
Fund age in months 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0004
(1.75) [1.27] (-0.15) [-0.94]
Log (fund size) -0.0202 -0.0154 -0.0057 0.0005
(-1.53) [-1.29] (-0.46) [0.05]
Log (inception family size) 0.0656** 0.0658**
[35.76] [35.84]
Table 11
Explaining hedge fund performance, controlling for selection bias
The Heckman (1979) selection model is used to control for selection bias in regressions on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. Two sets of regressions are estimated:
one with monthly return as the dependent variable and another with monthly alpha as the dependent variable. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model. The variable FLOW_POS is fund flow last month when flow is positive and is equal to zero otherwise. The variable FLOW_NEG is fund flow last month when
flow is negative and is equal to zero otherwise. For each set of regressions, the left-most column reports the regression results before correcting for selection bias. The middle
column reports the results from a probit selection equation, estimated using maximum likelihood, for the probability of a hedge fund offering favorable redemption terms, i.e.,
redemption frequency less than or equal to a month. The right-most column reports the regression results after correcting for selection bias. The coeffient estimates are estimated
using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with year, strategy, and geographical region fixed effects. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors that are
clustered by fund, are in parentheses. The z -statistics are in brackets. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. *significant at the 5% level; **significant
at the 1% level.
Heckman model Heckman model
Dependent variable = monthly return Dependent variable = monthly alpha
